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Deciding with Dignity: The Terminally Ill
Patient's Right to Information About the
California End of Life Option Act
by CHRISTINE SUNG*
Introduction
"Goodbye to all my dear friends and family that I love. Today is the
day I have chosen to pass away with dignity in the face of my terminal
illness ... I even have a ring of support around my bed as I type ...
Goodbye world."' On November 1, 2014, Brittany Maynard ended her life
2
in her home in Oregon after posting this quote on her Facebook account.
After suffering for months from glioblastoma, an aggressive brain cancer,
Maynard and her husband moved from California to Oregon and
established residency there shortly after being informed that she only had
six months to live in order to access Oregon's Death with Dignity law,
which was not yet passed in California at the time.3 Although Maynard
was able to utilize the rights afforded by the Oregon law, she was required
to move away from her home to do so. Maynard's death made
international headlines and re-invigorated the right to die movement across
the country.4
In October 2015, California Governor Edmund "Jerry" Brown signed
the End of Life Option Act ("California Act") into law,5 which legalized
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5. End of Life Option Act, Assemb. 15, 2015 Leg., 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 1 (Cal. 2015)
(codified as amended at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443 (2016)).
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physician aid-in-dying for competent residents who are terminally ill with
less than six months to live.6 Governor Brown stated that his decision was
swayed by his reflection on what he himself would want if he were put in a
situation facing death.7 He continued saying, "it would be a comfort to be
able to consider the options afforded by this bill and [he] wouldn't deny
that right to others."8
The California Act grants California residents the ability to have a
peaceful and autonomous death, by being able to die on their own terms
through the aid-in-dying drug.9 The requirements of the California Act are
similar to that of other states in many aspects, such as only permitting
terminally ill, competent residents to utilize physician aid-in-dying and
requiring the physician to obtain informed consent from the patient prior to
prescribing the aid-in-dying drug.o To date, every version of the End of
Life Option Act ("EOLO Act")" includes a provision that protects health
care providers who refuse to participate in the EOLO Act for reasons of
morality, conscience, and ethics by exempting them from liability. 12 These
immunity provisions, also referred to as conscience clauses, allow
physicians and health care providers to refuse to participate in the
California Act.13 In the Oregon and Washington Acts, there is no guidance
on whether the word "participation" includes providing information.14 In
the Vermont Act, there is a specific provision that requires physicians to
disclose information about aid-in-dying and explicitly excludes the act of
6. CNN Wire, Gov. Brown Signs End of Life Option Act, Legalizing Assisted Suicide for
Terminally Ill, KTLA 5, (Oct. 5, 2015, 12:44 PM), http://ktla.com/2015/10/05/gov-brown-signs-
medical-aid-in-dying-bill-legalizing-assisted-suicide-in-california.
7. Letter from Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. to the Members of the Cal. State Assembly
(Oct. 5. 2015), https://tribktla.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/statement.jpg.
8. Id.
9. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 443 etseq. (2016).
10. Id.; Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.800 et seq. (2016);
Washington Death with Dignity Act, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.415.010 et seq. (2016); Patient
Choice at End of Life, VT. STAT. ANN. § § 5281 et seq. (2016).
11. For the purposes of this Note, the "EOLO Act" refers to similar Acts from other states,
such as Oregon, Washington, and Vermont; and the "California Act" refers to the End of Life
Option Act in California.
12. OR. REv. STAT. § 127.885(4) (2016); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.190 (2016); VT.
STAT. ANN. § 5285 (2016).
13. Id.
14. For Healthcare Providers, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://www.deathwithdignity.
org/learn/healthcare-providers (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (This website provides links to
materials that each state has published to assist health care providers with navigating their
respective acts. None of the materials on this website set forth guidance on what the scope of the
term "participation" covers in the given state.).
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giving information from the definition of "participation."15 However, the
California Act defines participation to include informing a patient about his
or her rights under the California Act and referring the patient to a
participating physician in the definition of "participation."' 6 Under certain
circumstances, this broad definition of "participation" in the California Act
may lead to a violation of the state constitutional right to privacy and more
specifically the right to bodily autonomy and the doctrine of informed
consent. It may also lead to conflicting obligations on the part of the
physician brought about by the California Terminally Ill Patient's Right to
Know End-of-Life Options Act ("Right to Know Act").1 7 This Note will
assess whether the current California Act violates the California
Constitution and/or the doctrine of informed consent by allowing
physicians to refuse to give information about the act to their patients.
Part I of this Note will discuss the history and development of the
right to die'8 in California and the history and rationale of conscience
clauses, which have affected the development of the right to die in many
ways. Part II of this Note will lay out the requirements of the California
Act. Part III will analyze whether the conscience clause of the California
Act violates the patient's California constitutional right to privacy. This
Part will focus on the patient's right to make his or her own medical
decisions through the right to privacy in the California Constitution and
how, out of necessity, this may grant the patient the right to information
about aid-in-dying. This Part will also set forth defenses that the physician
may have, as part of the balancing test required in examining privacy
claims. Then, Part IV will explore an alternative route and establish the
patient's right to information about aid-in-dying through the patient's rights
under the doctrine of informed consent. Lastly, Part V will examine
potential solutions to the apparent conflict between the patient's rights and
section 443.14(e)(2) of the California Act ("conscience clause of the
California Act") and the feasibility of revising this section of the California
Act to comply with the requirements of the California Constitution and the
doctrine of informed consent.
15. VT. STAT. ANN. § 5282 (2016).
16. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.14(e) (2016).
17. See CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. I, § 1 (1974); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 442 et
seq. (2016) (requiring physicians to inform and counsel their terminally ill patients of all legal
end-of-life options).
18. The term "right to die" in other contexts may encompass the right to various acts such
as active suicide, passive suicide, euthanasia, and palliative sedation. However, for the context of




In Anglo-American jurisprudence, the idea of the right to die was
historically not only strongly opposed, but also seen as too taboo to even
discuss.'9 In most states, physicians who assist patients in dying are
deemed to commit manslaughter-a felony charge.2 0 Given the compelling
moral and legal concerns behind aid-in-dying, it took multiple attempts and
revisions, along with providing a method for physicians to opt out through
the inclusion of a conscience clause, to pass the California Act.
California has a rich history with respect to the aid-in-dying
movement. The movement began in 1980 when Derek Humphry founded
the first right to die organization in the United States, the Hemlock
Society,21 in Santa Monica, California. The Hemlock Society assisted
those who were terminally ill in obtaining a peaceful death.22 The
Hemlock Society also distributed information to terminally ill patients on
how to die.23 A decade later in 1990, Dr. Jack Kevorkian helped several
patients die and, as a result, was convicted of second-degree murder for one
of the deaths in 1999.24
In 1986, the Americans Against Human Suffering launched a
campaign for the introduction of a physician-assisted suicide ballot
initiative in collaboration with the Hemlock Society.2 5 This campaign later
produced the 1992 California Death with Dignity Act, which would have
legalized physician aid-in-dying by permitting physicians to either
administer medication to terminally ill patients or prescribe medication for
terminally ill patients to administer themselves.26 However, the proposition
27was defeated in a fifty-four to forty-six percent vote by California voters.
19. Richard E. Coleson, Contemporary Religious Viewpoints on Suicide, Physician-Assisted
Suicide, and Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 35 DUQ. L. REv. 43 (1996).
20. Assisted Suicide Laws in the United States, PATIENTS RIGHTS COUNCIL,
http://www.patientsrightscouncil.org/site/assisted-suicide-state-laws (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).
21. The Hemlock Society later evolved into End-Of-Life Choices, which merged with
Compassion in Dying in 2005 to form Compassion & Choices, an organization that works
towards protecting patients' rights in end-of-life care.
22. Chronology of Assisted Dying, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://www.deathwith
dignity. org/assisted-dying-chronology (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).
23. Id
24. See People v. Kevorkian, 248 Mich. App. 373 (2011).
25. MARGARET OTLOWSKI, VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA AND THE COMMON LAW 279
(Clarendon Press Oxford 1997). The Americans Against Human Suffering was later renamed
Americans for Death with Dignity.
26. DEATH WITH DIGNITY, supra note 22.
27. Id.
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Similar bills were reintroduced in 1995, 1999, 2005, and 2007, all of which
ultimately failed.2 8
In January 2015, California Senators Lois Wolk and Bill Monning
introduced the End of Life Option Act.29 After a series of hearings and
amendments, the Act passed in June 2015 and Governor Brown signed it
into law in October 2015.30 Soon after, in November 2015, opponents
gathered to collect signatures to have the law overturned.3 ' In January
2016, opponents announced that the ballot referendum to overturn the law
32
failed to garner enough signatures. As a result, the law became effective
on June 9, 2016.33 The law will sunset on January 1, 2026, unless the
Legislature extends it. 34
Prior to the passage of the California Act, many health care providers,
religious groups, and California residents strongly opposed it. For
objecting health care providers, the concern lies within the Hippocratic
Oath that physicians must take and the apparent conflict with the duties
specified in the Oath.35  The argument stands on the presumption that
assisting a terminally ill patient with ending his or her life prior to the end
of their natural life is performing a "harm," rather than a "benefit" to the
patient. However, the modem version of the Hippocratic Oath does not
include the specific clause often cited as a conflict, that the physician will
"be of benefit, or at least do no harm" to the patient.3 6 For religious groups,
28. HOWARD BALL, AT LIBERTY TO DIE: THE BATTLE FOR DEATH WITH DIGNITY IN
AMERICA 112-19 (New York Univ. Press 2012).
29. End of Life Option Act, S. 128, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015).
30. The bill Governor Brown signed was the amended Assembly Bill 15 introduced in
August 2015. See Death with Dignity in Calfornia: A History, DEATH WITH DIGNITY,
https://www.deathwithdignity.org/death-with-dignity-califomia-history (last visited Mar. 30,
2016) (detailing the legislative history of the California Act).
31. The Cahfornia End of Life Option Act and Death with Dignity, DEATH WITH DIGNITY,
(Jan. 22, 2016), https://www.deathwithdignity.org/news/2016/01/california-end-of-life-option-act.
32. Id
33. California, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://www.deathwithdignity.org/states/california
(last visited Sept. 27, 2016).
34. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.215 (2016).
35. Helene Starks, Denise Dudzinski, & Nicole White, Physician Aid-in-Dying, ETHICS IN
MEDICINE, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON SCHOOL OF MEDICINE (Apr. 2013), https://depts.
washington.edu/bioethx/topics/pad.html. See also SUSAN STEFAN, RATIONAL SUICIDE,
IRRATIONAL LAWS: EXAMINING CURRENT APPROACHES TO SUICIDE IN POLICY AND LAW 226
(Oxford Univ. Press 2016) (citing HERBERT HENDIN, SEDUCED BY DEATH: DOCTORS, PATIENTS
AND ASSISTED SUICIDE 67 (W. W. Norton & Co., Inc. 1998)).
36. Starks, Dudzinski, & White, supra note 35; Louis Lasagna, Hippocratic Oath, Modern
Version (1964), http://guides.Iibrary.jhu.edu/c.php?g-202502&p=1 335759.
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such as Christian organizations, aid-in-dying is viewed as suicide.37 In the
United States, after the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade,
Congress and a number of other state legislatures, including California,
began enacting conscience clauses, which allow exemption from
participation in a law for reasons of religion or conscience.3 9 In the context
of aid-in-dying and the California Act, the conscience clause permits the
physician to refuse to assist the patient in procuring the aid-in-dying drug
for reasons of conscience.40 The rationale behind conscience clauses is the
protection of health care providers' freedom of religion rights under the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution41 and article 1, section 4
of the California Constitution.4 2 4 3
However, the conscience clause in the California Act broadly extends
to permitting the physician to withhold information about the Act from the
patient." Although terminally ill patients are now legally able to receive
physician aid-in-dying, this right can easily be overlooked if the patient is
not properly informed about it. The physician's refusal to inform the
patient of his or her rights under the California Act may be anticipated in
certain circumstances, given that until recently, it was still considered a
crime.45 However, the patient's right to the information about the
California Act should still be afforded some protections.
37. Cara Elkin, Note, Renewed Compassion for the Dying in Compassion in Dying v. State
of Washington, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 1, 6 (1996).
38. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
39. Claire Marshall, The Spread of Conscience Clause Litigation, HUMAN RIGHTS MAG.
(Jan. 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/humanrightsmagazine home/2013 vol
39/january_2013_no 2_religious_freedom/thespread of conscience-clause legislation.html.
40. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.14(e) (2016).
41. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
42. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4.
43. W. Eugene Basanta, Communicating with Dying Patients: Informed Consent, Physician
First Amendment Rights, and State Regulation in the United States, Proceedings of the 18th
World Congress on Medical Law (2010); David A. Carrillo & Shane G. Smith, Calfornia
Constitutional Law: The Religion Clauses, 45 U.S.F. L. REv. 689 (2011).
44. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.14(e)(2) (2016) (Physicians are not subject to
liability for "refusing to participate in activities authorized under this part, including, but not
limited to, refusing to inform a patient regarding his or her rights under this part, and not referring
an individual to a physician who participates in activities authorized under this part.").
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (2016). See also Donorovich-Odonnell v. Harris, 241 Cal.
App. 4th 1118 (2015) (holding that the "state constitutional right of autonomy privacy does not
authorize physicians to prescribe lethal drugs for patients to use for suicide.").
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II. The Requirements of the California Death with Dignity Act
The California Act has requirements for both eligibility and actions
that must be taken prior to obtaining the aid-in-dying drug. For eligibility,
the patient requesting the aid-in-dying drug from the physician must be an
adult with the capacity to make medical decisions, who has a terminal
disease diagnosis from his or her attending physician.46 The California Act
defines a "terminal disease" as an incurable and irreversible illness that will
result in death in less than six months, as confirmed by reasonable medical
judgment.4 7 The California Act requires that the patient be a California
resident.48 He or she must also have the ability to self-administer the aid-
in-dying drug.49 The request must come from the patient him or herself and
cannot come from an agent, conservator, or surrogate.50 If a patient meets
the aforementioned criteria, he or she is deemed a "qualified individual."
The main concern of the California Act is section 443.14(e)(2), which
may effectively rule out any guarantees of a physician obtaining informed
consent, if utilized. Section 443.14(e)(2) states:
Notwithstanding any other law, a health care provider is
not subject to civil, criminal, administrative, disciplinary,
employment, credentialing, professional discipline,
contractual liability, or medical staff action, sanction, or
penalty or other liability for refusing to participate in
activities authorized under this part, including, but not
limited to, refusing to inform a patient regarding his or her
rights under this part, and not referring an individual to a
physician who participates in activities authorized under
this part.52
As stated above, the California Act explicitly states that the physician
is not required to inform the patient of the Act and the rights it affords. The
Act allows the physician or health care provider5 3 to determine whether
46. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.2(a).
47. Id. at § 443.1(q).
48. Id. at § 443.2(a)(3).
49. Id. at § 443.2(a)(5).
50. Id. at § 443.2(c).
51. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.1(o) (2016).
52. Id. at § 443.14(e)(2) (emphasis added).
53. Id. at § 443.1(h) (defining "health care provider" to be: "any person licensed or certified
pursuant to Division 2 (commencing with Section 500) of the Business and Professions Code; any
person licensed pursuant to the Osteopathic Initiative Act or the Chiropractic Initiative Act; any
95
they want to provide the information or participate in the act by making it
optional-rather than mandatory-so long as the physician or health care
provider abstains for reasons of conscience, morality, or ethics.54
It is also important to note that the California Act distinguishes the
reach of the word "participation" in cases where the physician decides to
opt out of the California Act from cases where the health care provider
decides to opt out of the California Act, but its employees do not.5  The
term "participation" is used again in section 443.15, which prohibits
physicians from participating in the California Act on the premises owned
or managed by the prohibiting health care provider, or while acting in the
scope of employment.56  However, "participation" under these
circumstances does not include "providing information [about the
California Act] to a patient [upon the request of the individual]"57 or
"providing an individual, upon request, with a referral to another
[participating physician]." Soon after the bill passed, the California
Medical Association ("CMA") released guidelines on how the California
Act should be applied.59 The guidelines clearly lay out what is required of
both the physician and patient involved, and reiterate much of what is
stated above.60  The CMA guidelines reaffirm the application of the
conscience clause of the California Act.
III. The Patient's Rights Under the California Constitutional
Right to Privacy
Because the California Act does not ensure that a qualified patient will
be able to obtain information about aid-in-dying, the patient must establish
that he or she is entitled to the information in order to receive it from
physicians who refuse to participate in the California Act. Although
person certified pursuant to Division 2.5 (commencing with Section 1797) of this code; and any
clinic, health dispensary, or health facility licensed pursuant to Division 2 (commencing with
Section 1200) of this code," which includes physicians).
54. Id. at § 443.14(e)(1).
55. Compare section 443.14(b) (explaining that participation includes the refusal to inform
a patient of his or her rights and not referring an individual to a physician who participates in
activities authorized under this part), with section 443.15(f)(3) (explaining that participation does
not include "providing information to a patient about this part" or "providing a patient, upon the
patient's request, with a referral to another heath care provider for the purposes of participating in
the activities authorized by this part").
56. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.15(a) (2016).
57. Id at § 443.15(f)(3)(B).
58. Id at § 443.15(f)(3)(C).
59. CMA Legal Counsel, Document #3459: The Calfornia End of Life Option Act, CMA
ON-CALL, Jan. 2016.
60. Id.
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California courts have refused to extend the right of privacy and bodily
autonomy to mean that the individual has a state constitutional right to
physician assisted suicide,6 1 this refusal does not rule out whether the
individual has a state constitutional right to the information regarding the
newly passed California Death with Dignity Act. Historically, the right to
privacy grants the patient the right to make his or her own medical
decisions through the right to bodily autonomy.6 2 The right to privacy
stems from both the United States Constitution and the California
Constitution. However, under both constitutions, the right to privacy is not
absolute and must be balanced against the interests of the entity that is
violating such right, regardless of whether it is the state6 3 or, under the
California Constitution, a private entity.64 Thus, if the countervailing
interests outweigh the privacy interests, the violation of the right to privacy
may be justified, depending on the means used to further the countervailing
interests. In the circumstance of the patient's right to know about his or her
right to aid-in-dying, the countervailing interest is the physician's right of
conscience. Then, we determine whether allowing the physician to refuse
to give the patient information about aid-in-dying is an appropriate and
justified means of protecting the physician's right of conscience. Prior to
conducting this balancing test, we must first establish the patient's right to
know about the right to aid-in-dying as a right that stems from the patient's
right to privacy.
Under the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court has held that
the right to privacy can be interpreted in the word "liberty" of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment65 and in the Ninth
Amendment.66 In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court created the
61. See, e.g., Donorovich-Odonell v. Harris, 241 Cal. App. 4th 1118, 1136 (2015).
62. See Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186 (1984) (holding that competent
patients with serious illnesses have the right to withdraw from life-support treatments, even if it
will hasten death); see also Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127 (1986) (holding that
patients who are mentally competent and understand the risks involved have the right to refuse
treatment).
63. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 504 (1965) (stating that if the statute is
"reasonably necessary for the effectuation of a legitimate and substantial state interest, and not
arbitrary or capricious in application, [it is] not invalid under the Due Process Clause [of the
United States Constitution]") (citing Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1996)).
64. Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 655 (Cal. 1994) (An "invasion of
a privacy interest is not a violation of the state constitutional right to privacy if the invasion is
justified by a compelling interest.").
65. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 129 (1973); Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
66. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487.
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Peripheral Rights Doctrine on the basis of the Ninth Amendment-also
referred to as the "penumbra" theory-reasoning that the Bill of Rights
creates "zones of privacy" in many of the Amendments in the Bill of
Rights, thus meaning that the right to privacy granted by the Constitution is
not an explicit right but is granted through another enumerated right and
67thus is specific to the action or thing that is in question. Many subsequent
cases have followed the "penumbra" theory that Griswold created.68
However, the right to privacy under the United States Constitution only
applies to government action and holds less force than the California
constitutional right to privacy because it is implied, rather than explicit.6 9
We turn to the right to privacy under the California Constitution, which is
not only broader and more protective, as it applies to both state and private
actors, but is also explicitly stated.70
A. The California Constitutional Right to Privacy and Its Elements
In contrast to the right to privacy under the U.S. Constitution, the right
to privacy, also known as the Privacy Initiative,71 is explicitly stated in the
California Constitution as an inalienable right.72 Under article I, section 1
of the California Constitution, the inalienable rights include "enjoying and
defending life and liberty ... and pursing and obtaining safety, happiness,
and privacy."73 In determining whether the state interest justifies a
violation of the right to privacy under the California Constitution,
California courts hold that the state must show that it has a "compelling
interest" that is furthered by the invasion of the individual's privacy.74
Because the California Constitution classifies the right to privacy as a
fundamental liberty, "it is protected even from incidental encroachment,"
unless the violating party can show that there is a compelling interest that is
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. 113; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
69. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
70. See Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997); see also JOSEPH R.
GRODIN, CALVIN R. MASSEY, & RICHARD B. CUNNINGHAM, THE CALIFORNIA STATE
CONSTITUTION 32-34 (G. Alan Tarr ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2011).
71. Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 641 (Cal. 1994).
72. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
73. Id.
74. See Bd. of Trs. v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 516, 524-25 (1981) (citing City of
Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1980); Britt v. Superior Court 574 P.2d 766 (Cal.
1978)).
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both "legitimate and overriding."" In the case at hand, the violating party
could potentially be either the legislature that enacted the conscience clause
of the California Act or the physician who failed to disclose the necessary
information. The countervailing interests weighed in the balancing test will
differ depending on whom the violation of privacy claim is against.
Furthermore, even if the violating party can prove that there is a compelling
interest, the violation must also be the least intrusive means of furthering
said interest.76
The elements required in proving a claim for violation of the right to
privacy under the California Constitution are as follows: (1) the plaintiff
must have a legally protected privacy interest; (2) society must be prepared
to recognize that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy under the
circumstances; and (3) the conduct of the defendant must amount to a
serious invasion of the protected privacy interest of the plaintiff.77 These
elements are deemed to be "threshold components of a valid claim," rather
than a "categorical test," which are structured to act as a gatekeeper to
78
exclude cases with only de minimis intrusions.
B. Application of the Elements of the Right to Privacy
1. The Patient Has a Legally Protected Privacy Interest in Obtaining
Information About Aid-in-Dying
The patient must first show that he or she has a specific and legally
protected privacy interest in obtaining information about aid-in-dying.79
Recognized legally protected rights generally fall into one of two
categories: (1) informational privacy, which prohibits the distribution of
personal confidential information, or (2) autonomy privacy, which protects
one's interest in making personal intimate decisions and in conducting
personal activities without surveillance.80  The patient's interests in
choosing his or her own preferred course of medical treatment would fall
within the latter of the two: autonomy privacy.8 1
75. Pearce v. Club Med Sales, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 407, 410 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (applying the
right to privacy under the California Constitution) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965)).
76. Id. (citing Fults v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. App. 3d 899 (1979)).
77. Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 654-55 (Cal. 1994).
78. Leonel v. Am. Airlines, 400 F.3d 702, 712 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Loder v. City of
Glendale, 927 P.2d 1200, 1230 (Cal. 1997)).
79. Hill, 865 P.2d at 654.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 651 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977) (The right to privacy
contains interest in having the "independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.")).
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Autonomy privacy has been frequently referred to as the right to
bodily autonomy, the right of self-determination, or the right of control
over bodily integrity.82 California courts interpret these rights to mean that
the right to privacy "guarantees to the individual the freedom to choose to
reject, or refuse to consent to, intrusions of his [or her] bodily integrity." 83
In doing so, the law is aiming to preserve the "inviolability of the
person."84
Though a majority of cases brought on the basis of the right to bodily
autonomy have focused on the right to refuse medical treatment rather than
the right to die specifically, they introduce the "idea of the competent
patient's right to make medical decisions."5 Also, the patient's right to
make his or her own medical decisions can be "effectively exercise[d] only
if the patient possesses adequate information to enable an intelligent
choice."86 In other words, if the information is required for the patient to
make a medical decision, then the patient's state constitutional right to
privacy is not fully exercised until the patient has the required information.
So, it follows that in a situation where a qualified patient is deciding what
end-of-life option to choose, he or she has the right to know about the
California Act as a possible option. By withholding this information, the
physician is inhibiting the patient's ability to fully exercise his or her right
to bodily autonomy. Under this analysis, the patient is deemed to have a
legally protected privacy interest.
3. The Patient Has a Reasonable Expectation ofPrivacy
After establishing that the patient has a legally protected interest, the
patient must then prove that he or she has a reasonable expectation of
privacy under the circumstances that society is prepared to accept. An
objective analysis based on "widely accepted community norms" is used to
show a reasonable expectation of privacy.87 The analysis of reasonableness
may consist of a discussion of the "customs, practices, and physical settings
82. See, e.g., Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 195-96 (1984); Rains v.
Belshe, 32 Cal. App. 4th 157, 172 (1995); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 747 (1997).
83. Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 195 (citing Superintendent of Belchertown Sch. v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427 (1977)).
84. Id. (citing Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 427).
85. RUTH R. FADEN, TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, & NANCY M. P. KING, A HISTORY AND
THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 41 (Oxford Univ. Press 1986) (emphasis omitted).
86. Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1972).
87. Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 655 (Cal. 1994) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2016) ("The protection
afforded to the plaintiffs interest in his privacy must be relative to the customs of the time and
place, to the occupation of the plaintiff and to the habits of his neighbors and fellow citizens.").
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surrounding [the] particular activit[y]" and any other circumstances that
may limit or expand the patient's reasonable expectation.8 8 For example, if
advance notice was given to the patient regarding the privacy intrusion, it
may reduce the severity of the intrusion.89 Thus, if the patient was notified
initially that his or her provider objected to participation, then this fact will
weigh against he patient having a reasonable expectation of privacy in this
particular situation.90
When a patient goes to a physician and gets diagnosed with a terminal
illness, the patient can expect the physician to disclose recommended
treatments, along with any feasible alternatives. Traditionally, physicians
were permitted to, and often did, overrule patients' preferences and
decisions.91 This paternalistic approach to medical decisions has since
evolved into the modern day autonomous approach, in favor of the
patient's choice.92 The American Medical Association ("AMA") states,
"The patient has the right to make decisions regarding the health care that
is recommended by his or her physician."93 The purpose for this right is to
help physicians foster a partnership with the patient "by providing
information and allowing for autonomous decision-making."94
Accordingly, the patient's right to make his or her own medical
decisions should be a reasonable expectation of privacy, given the current
customs and practices that guide the physician-patient relationship in
making medical decisions. Modern health care practices also indicate that
physicians should provide the information needed for the patient to make a
medical decision. So, a qualified patient making a medical decision on an
end-of-life treatment can reasonably expect that he or she will get the
information necessary to facilitate such a decision. The difficulty arises
when determining whether the patient has a reasonable expectation to
obtain the information about aid-in-dying specifically. Given the strong
opposition to the California Act and aid-in-dying within the medical field,
the physician may argue that health care customs dictate that there is no
reasonable expectation to the information about aid-in-dying, since aid-in-
dying is not widely accepted. However, the patient may argue that the
88. Id
89. Id. (citing Ingersoll v. Palmer, 743 P.2d 1299, 1316 (Cal. 1987)).
90. See Loder v. City of Glendale, 927 P.2d 1200, 1232 (Cal. 1997); Leonel v. Am.
Airlines, 400 F.3d 702, 713 (9th Cir. 2005).
91. Matthew McCoy, Autonomy, Consent, and Medical Paternalism: Legal Issues in
Medical Intervention, 14 J. ALTERNATIVE & COMPLEMENTARY MED. 785, 786 (2008).
92. Id




information about aid-in-dying is necessary to making a complete decision,
because it is an option that he or she can legally choose. Therefore, the
patient has a reasonable expectation to obtain the information.
3. Defendant's Conduct Amounts to a Serious Invasion ofPatient's Rights
The last threshold component to establish a claim to privacy is a
showing that the defendant's conduct amounts to a serious invasion of the
patient's rights. The defendant in this situation could be either the
legislature or the physician.95 The patient may have a claim against the
legislature,96 arguing that the broad reach of the conscience clause violates
the patient's constitutional right to make medical decisions. The patient
may also have a claim against the physician, as a private entity,9 7 who
chooses to exercise this conscience clause and thus fails to fulfill his
obligation to the patient to give assistance in making a medical decision.
For the purpose of this Note, the focus will be on showing that the
physician has an obligation to the patient to give him or her this
information, though the patient may also have a claim against the
legislature. Both claims require the patient to establish that the information
the physician is permitted to omit is essential to the patient being able to
adequately exercise his or her right to make a medical decision.
A serious invasion of the right to privacy must be something that
amounts to "an egregious breach of the social norms."9 8 Evaluating "the
extent and gravity of invasion is an indispensable consideration in
assessing an alleged invasion of privacy."99 This must be evaluated in light
of how vital the information withheld from the patient is to the patient's
right to make a medical decision. If the patient can show that knowing the
information is essential to making a full and informed medical decision,
then the nondisclosure of the information may amount to an egregious
violation of social norms. The purpose of this element is to essentially rule
out any de minimis invasions of privacy.100 This third element can be
considered very closely tied with the second element of having a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Although the third element is more
95. Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 642 (Cal. 1994).
96. See, e.g., Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 806 (Cal. 1997) (Plaintiffs
sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the state claiming that the legislation in dispute
violated the state constitutional right to privacy.).
97. See, e.g., Hill, 865 P.2d at 637 (Plaintiffs brought an action claiming that an
intercollegiate athletic association's drug testing program was a violation of the state
constitutional right to privacy.).
98. Id. at 655.
99. Id.
100. Loder v. City of Glendale, 927 P.2d 1200, 1231 (Cal. 1997).
102 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 44:1
Fall 2016] PATIENT'S RIGHT AND THE END OF LIFE OPTION ACT
focused on the violation on behalf of the physician, rather than what the
patient can reasonably expect, both elements require an examination of
customs and norms. Borrowing from the analysis in the second element
above, the patient can argue that the customs in health care and in
physician-patient relationships is for the physician to facilitate the patient's
autonomous medical decision by disclosing all the necessary information.
Withholding vital information is an egregious breach of social norms, and
not what is expected in the modem day physician-patient relationship.
4. Defenses to the Violation of the Right to Privacy: Weighing the Patient's
Right to Privacy Against the Physician's Right to Freedom ofReligion
As stated Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, the right to
privacy is not absolute and must be balanced against other countervailing
interests. 101 The three elements set forth in Hill are only threshold
elements, which act as gatekeepers to keep out claims for only de minimis
intrusions.10 2 After meeting these threshold elements, the final step of
analyzing a privacy claim is weighing the defendant's justifications for the
privacy intrusion.1 03 In the application of a balancing test, the focus is on
any interests that the physician may have in withholding the information.
Just as the patient has the right to privacy and to bodily autonomy, the
physician is also entitled to freedom of religion and freedom of speech.
After the Right to Know Act passed, many opponents raised First
Amendment claims. In an article by W. Eugene Basanta, he wrote about
whether a physician could still refuse to abide by the Right to Know Act
claiming that it was a violation of his First Amendment rights.'0" In
regards to the freedom of religion, Basanta applied the rational basis test,
which is afforded to statutes that are neutral on their face.05 He proposed
that, because the purpose of the Act was to facilitate better communications
between the patient and the physician, it will likely pass the rational basis
test and is, thus, constitutional.106  Although Basanta's analysis was
primarily focused on the constitutionality of the Right to Know Act, the
underlying purposes of the Right to Know Act demonstrate the importance
of physician-patient communication. For the purposes of the conscience
clause of the California Act, this would weigh strongly in the patient's
favor in balancing the patient's right to the information against the
101. Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 655-56 (Cal. 1994).
102. Loder, 927 P.2d at 1230.
103. Id.
104. Basanta, supra note 43.
105. Id. at 5-6.
106. Id
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physician's right of conscience. Furthermore, conscience clauses typically
protect the party from actions that would be against his or her religion or
morals. 107 By only requiring the physician to disclose information and not
participate in the act of actually assisting the death, the patient can argue
that this is requiring a lesser burden on the physician.
As part of the right to privacy analysis, courts have also considered
whether there are alternative or less intrusive methods to fulfill the
countervailing interests.1os The purpose of enacting conscience clauses is
to protect the physician's and health care provider's constitutional freedom
of religion.109 In doing so, other conscience clauses in EOLO Acts in other
states do not broaden the scope of their coverage. 0 As stated above, the
conscience clause in the California Act is the only one of the four existing
EOLO Acts that explicitly allows physicians to refuse to give information
about the rights afforded by the California Act."' As stated by the court in
Bartling v. Superior Court, "[I]f the right of the patient to self-
determination as to his [or her] own medical treatment is to have any
meaning at all, it must be paramount to the interest of the patient's hospital
and doctors.""12 Though the California Act is more instructive on what the
term "participation" means, the broad reach of the term leaves the patient
with little or no recourse for utilizing his or her own right to bodily
autonomy.
IV. The Patient's Rights Under the Common Law Doctrine of
Informed Consent
To further bolster the patient's claim of possessing a right to the
information about the California Act, this part of the Note will examine the
patient's rights under the doctrine of informed consent. The doctrine of
informed consent is traditionally a doctrine of tort law, as well as an issue
of medical ethics.'"3 Informed consent, though a common law doctrine, is
107. Marshall, supra note 39.
108. Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 652 (Cal. 1994) (citing White v.
Davis, 533 P.2d 222 (Cal. 1975)).
109. Marshall, supra note 39.
110. OR. REv. STAT. § 127.885(4) (2016); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.190 (2016); VT.
STAT. ANN. § 5285 (2016).
111. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.14(e)(2) (2016).
112. Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 195 (1984).
113. Sarah Runels, Note, Informed Consent Laws and the Constitution: Balancing State
Interests with a Physician's First Amendment Rights and a Woman's Due Process Rights, 26 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 185 (2010) (citing Cruzan by Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990)).
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grounded in the right of privacy, and more specifically, the right of bodily
autonomy.114
A. The History and Purpose of the Doctrine of Informed Consent
Justice A. Frank Bray coined the term "informed consent" in 1957 in
his opinion for Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board Of Trustees,
where he wrote that physicians have a duty to disclose "any facts which are
necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to
proposed treatment."'15  Although not a purpose in the creation of the
doctrine of informed consent, in practice, informed consent has been
frequently offered as a defense to several torts.116  Originally, it was a
defense to the torts of assault and battery.'17 However in modem day, it
has become a defense to the tort of negligence for physicians treating
patients, which may offer immunity from liability.118 This transition
occurred due to the statutory codification of the doctrine of informed
consent in many states, including California,"1 9 as a basis for a medical
malpractice claim by arguing that the failure to obtain informed consent-
resulted in a breach of the physician's fiduciary duty to disclose to the
patient.120 It has also been referred to as a claim for "lack of informed
consent."1 21 The California Supreme Court has distinguished the claim for
lack of informed consent from the claim for battery, stating that they are
separate causes of action: the former occurs when a physician does not
"adequately disclos[e] the risks and alternatives" of the procedure prior to
performance, while the latter occurs when the physician does not obtain
any consent prior to performing a procedure.122 The former, the lack of
informed consent, will be the focus of the discussion below.
114. TERRANCE MCCONNELL, INALIENABLE RIGHTS: THE LIMITS OF CONSENT IN
MEDICINE AND THE LAW 65 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000).
115. William A. Silverman, The Myth of Informed Consent: In Daily Practice and in
Clinical Trials, 15 J. MED. ETHICS 6 (1989) (quoting Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of
Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. 1957)); FADEN, BEAUCHAMP, & KING, supra note 85, at 125.
116. FADEN, BEAUCHAMP, & KING, supra note 85, at 125-32.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. CAL. CrV. CODE § 3333.1(c)(2) (2016).
120. FADEN, BEAUCHAMP, & KING, supra note 85, at 139-40.
121. See, e.g., Jameson v. Desta, 215 Cal. App. 4th 1144 (2013).
122. Saxena v. Goffney, 159 Cal. App. 4th 316, 324 (2008).
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B. The Components and Elements of Informed Consent
In general, the analytical components of informed consent are
disclosure, comprehension, competence, voluntariness, and consent.123 The
final component of consent may also be referred to as "authorization,"
which is the formal aspect of informed consent, requiring the patient to sign
an informed consent form. 124 "Disclosure" requires that the physician give
the patient the necessary information for the patient to make an
autonomous decision.125 "Comprehension" and "competence" are closely
related, but the former is referring to comprehension of the information
disclosed, while the latter is referring to the competency of the patient to
give informed consent.12 6 "Voluntariness" entails that the patient made the
decision freely, in absence of fraud, duress, coercion, or undue influence by
another person, including the physician.127
According to California courts, consent is considered "informed" only
after the physician has disclosed all material information necessary for the
patient to consider in making a medical decision.12 8 "Material information"
includes the chances of success and the risks of the procedure in language
that the patient can understand.129  These risks include those that a
reasonable person in the patient's position would consider important, as
well as any information a skilled physician would disclose to the patient,
under similar circumstances.130 Essentially, the physician must give the
patient as much information as needed for the patient to make an informed
decision.
For the patient to make a claim against a physician for failure to obtain
informed consent, the patient must prove that: (1) the physician performed
a medical procedure on the patient; (2) the patient did not give his or her
informed consent for the procedure performed; (3) a reasonable person in
the patient's position would not have agreed to the procedure if given full
disclosure of the results and risks of and alternatives to the procedure; and
123. FADEN, BEAUCHAMP, & KING, supra note 85, at 274. See also MCCONNELL, supra
note 114, at 65.
124. MCCONNELL, supra note 114, at 65.
125. FADEN, BEAUCHAMP, & KING, supra note 85, at 30.
126. Id. at 275.
127. Id See MCCONNELL, supra note 114, at 65.
128. See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1972); Jameson v. Desta, 215 Cal. App. 4th
1144, 1165 (2013).
129. McKinney v. Nash, 120 Cal. App. 3d 428, 440 (1981).
130. Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 905 (Cal. 1980).
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(4) the patient was harmed by a result or risk that the physician failed to
disclose prior to the performance of the procedure or treatment.1 3 1
C. Application of the Elements of Informed Consent: The Materiality of
the Information About the Patient's Rights Under the California Act
to the Patient Making an Informed Decision
After showing that the physician has performed a medical procedure,
the patient must prove that he or she did not give informed consent for the
procedure to be performed. This requires establishing the third and fourth
elements of informed consent: (1) showing that a reasonable person in the
patient's position would not have agreed to the procedure if the physician
gave full disclosure of the risks and alternatives to the procedure; and (2)
establishing a causal relationship by showing harm to the patient as a result
of the physician's failure to inform.
To establish the third element, the test that the California Supreme
Court uses to determine whether the information must be disclosed is the
"materiality to the patient's decision."'3 2  In evaluating this, California
takes a patient-based approach, which uses an objective test of how a
reasonable patient would have acted under the circumstances.13 3 However,
it might be of consequence to note that some California courts have
allowed the physician to use a subjective test as a defense, shifting the
burden of proof to the physician.13 4 This subjective test is an inquiry into
whether the particular patient at hand would have still consented in light of
the omitted information.3 5
To establish the fourth element, the California Supreme Court has held
that the patient must establish that he or she would not have given consent,
if the physician had disclosed the necessary information.' 36 In other words,
even if the physician did not disclose enough information to the patient to
obtain valid informed consent, it must be information that would have
changed the patient's decision regarding the medical procedure performed,
in order for the patient to succeed on this claim in California courts. Given
that the element of causation is subjective to the particular patient, this
section will focus on establishing the materiality of the information to a
131. See Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 1; Vandi v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 7 Cal. App. 4th 1064
(1992); Warren v. Schecter, 57 Cal. App. 4th 1189 (1997).
132. Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 11 (citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir.
1972)).
133. Jaime Staples King & Benjamin Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The Case for
Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J. L. & MED. 429, 461 (2006).
134. See, e.g., Warren, 57 Cal. App. 2d at 583 (citing Truman, 611 P.2d at 907 n.5).
135. Id.
136. Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1972).
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reasonable patient in making a medical decision on end-of-life options.
This begins with a discussion of what California courts have generally held
as material information, leading to a discussion of what is material
information in the specific context of end-of-life decisions.
1. The Duty to Disclose: How Much Disclosure Is Necessary
As stated above, it is well established that physicians have the duty to
disclose the necessary information to the patient in order for him or her to
give informed consent to the medical procedure being performed, subject to
exceptions.13 7  The information included in this duty consists of the
benefits, risks, and alternatives related to medical procedures requiring
informed consent. 138 With regards to alternatives, Cobbs v. Grant held that
the physician has the "duty of reasonable disclosure of the available
choices with respect to proposed therapy and the dangers inherently and
potentially involved in each."139
In Hernandez ex rel. Telles-Hernandez v. United States, the United
States District Court, applying California law, stated that the level of
disclosure necessary is "measured by the amount of knowledge a patient
needs in order to make an informed choice." 4 0 In Truman v. Thomas, the
California Supreme Court stated that this includes "all information material
to the patient's decision."l41 The standard for disclosure determines what
the term "material information" encompasses.14 2 Both the Hernandez and
the Truman courts applied a "reasonable person" standard, which required
the physician to disclose all information that the physician knows or should
know that a reasonable patient under similar circumstances would need to
know in order to make an informed decision.143 However, in order for a
fact to be "material," it must also be a fact that is not commonly
appreciated.'" Ultimately, the measure for how much the physician should
disclose to fulfill his or her duty has primarily depended on what standard
for disclosure the court applies. As stated above, California applies the
137. See, e.g., Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 11; Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317
P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. 1957); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
138. Salgo,317P.2dat 181.
139. Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 10 (emphasis added).
140. Hernandez ex. rel. Telles-Hernandez v. United States, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1077
(2009) (hereinafter "Hernandez") (citing Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 10).
141. Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 905 (Cal. 1980) (citing Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1,
11 (Cal. 1972).
142. Id.
143. Id; Hernandez, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1077.
144. Truman, 611 P.2d at 905 (citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,788 (D.C. Cir.
1972)).
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reasonable patient standard. In making end-of-life choices, the question is
what a reasonable patient would want to know, after being diagnosed with
a terminal illness with less than six months to live. Under the
circumstances, a terminally ill patient would want to know about all
options available to him or her, in order to weigh all the options and make a
full and complete decision. Given the passage of the California Act, it is
logical to infer that physicians should know about the California Act and
should know that a reasonable patient would want to know about this Act
in order to make such a decision.
2. The Duty to Disclose: Physician-Recommended Treatments or
Procedures
The Truman court also rejected the argument that the duty to disclose
only applies after a patient consents to the procedure that the physician
recommends.145 The court's rationale behind the purpose of the duty to
disclose was to give patients the chance to "meaningfully exercise their
right to make decisions about their own bodies."1 46  By rejecting a,
recommended procedure, the patient is not any more knowledgeable about
the procedure than a patient who consents.14 7 Furthermore, a patient's
rejection of a recommended procedure does not terminate the physician-
patient relationship and fiduciary duties that come along with it.1 48 Thus,
the duty of disclosure is not discharged simply by the patient's rejection of
a procedure the physician recommends. The Truman decision also
expanded the duty to disclose to include "recommended diagnostic as well
as therapeutic procedures."l49
California courts have held that there is no general duty for a
physician to disclose information regarding non-recommended
procedures.150 In Vandi v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., the patient-
plaintiff urged the court to include information about non-recommended
procedures as a necessary component in the physician's duty to disclose.15 1
The court rejected the patient's argument for such a rule due to the
difficulties in application. For example, one aspect requires the physician
to defer to the patient's desires, rather than the physician's medical
145. Id at 906.




149. Vandi v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 7 Cal. App. 4th 1064, 1069 (1992).
150. Id at 1071 (citing Scalere v. Stenson, 211 Cal. App. 3d 1446 (1989)).
151. Id.
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judgment.152 However, the court did not categorically exclude such a duty.
To impose such a duty, the patient must show evidence that the physician
should have disclosed the information concerning the non-recommended
procedure.15 3  More specifically, the patient must show that a skilled
physician in good standing within the medical community would have
disclosed the information under similar circumstances.154
While the patient is making a decision about which end-of-life option
to choose, it is a possibility that he or she will refuse to choose one of the
treatments that the physician recommends. However, as the Truman court
explains, this does not discharge the fiduciary duties that the physician has
to the patient, such as the duty to disclose.155 The physician must still fully
disclose to the patient all of the material information in making an end-of-
life decision. The physician may make an argument that aid-in-dying is a
non-recommended treatment and accordingly, the physician has no general
duty to disclose information about it. 156 However, the holding in Vandi
gives patients the opportunity to create such a duty by showing that a
skilled physician in good standing within the medical community would
have disclosed the information when counseling the patient about end-of-
life choices.157 To do so, the patient must prove that a reasonable physician
would disclose information about aid-in-dying to a terminally ill patient
making an end-of-life decision. The argument in favor of this proposition
is examined in the following section.
3. Material Information in Making End-of-Life Decisions: The Terminal
Patients'Right to Know End ofLife Options Act
In 2008, the California Legislature enacted the Terminal Patients'
Right to Know End of Life Options Act.158  The Right to Know Act
requires physicians to give terminally ill patients comprehensive
information and counseling regarding legal end-of-life options upon the
patient's request.159 The Right to Know Act lists a few end-of-life options,
including palliative care and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, but
152. Id. at 1070.
153. Id. at 1071.
154. Vandi v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 7 Cal. App. 4th 1064, 1071 (1992).
155. Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 906 (Cal. 1980).
156. Vandi, 7 Cal. App. 4th at 1071 (citing Scalere v. Stenson, 211 Cal. App. 3d 1446
(1989)).
157. Id.
158. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 442 et seq. (2016).
159. Id. at § 442.5(a).
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does not limit the coverage of information required to the options listed.' 60
Acknowledging the health care providers' right of conscience, the Right to
Know Act allows health care providers to opt out of these duties, so long as
they refer or transfer the patient to another health care provider that will
provide the information and inform the patient on the procedures of
transferring to another health care provider.'6' The Legislature stated in the
legislative findings of the Act that terminally ill patients rely on their
physicians to give them helpful information and without it, a host of
problems may occur, including the "needless physical and psychological
suffering to patients and their families."'6 2
After the passage of the California Death with Dignity Act, aid-in-
dying, now being a legal end-of-life option, should be included in the
information that physicians are required to disclose to terminally ill
patients. Otherwise, the physician would have to refer or transfer the
patient to another health care provider that will provide the information.
Therefore, unless the physician refers the patient to another participating.
provider, the Right to Know Act should be interpreted to require the
physician to disclose the information about aid-in-dying to a terminally ill
patient to comply with the Right to Know Act and remain in good standing
with the medical community. Contrary to this inference, the California Act
expressly exempts physicians from having to inform the terminally ill
patient on his or her right to aid-in-dying and from referral and transfer to
another health care provider that participates in the California Act.163
Consequently, the California Act violates the doctrine of informed consent
by allowing physicians to forgo fulfilling the duty to disclose prior to
performing a treatment or procedure on the patient.
V. Reconciling the Right to Privacy and the Doctrine of
Informed Consent with the Conscience Clause of the California
End of Life Option Act
The California End of Life Option Act permits physicians to opt out of
participation in the act, including giving information to patients about their
rights under the Act for reasons of conscience, morality, or ethics.164
However, the doctrine of informed consent and likely the California
Constitution require the physician to disclose to the patient alternatives that
160. Id. at § 442.5(b).
161. Id at § 442.7.
162. Terminally Ill Patient's Right to Know End-of-Life Options Act, Assemb. 2747, 2007
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008).
163. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.14(e)(2) (2016).
164. Id.
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a reasonable patient would want to know, which can arguably include the
right to aid-in-dying, prior to performing a procedure or treatment on the
patient to avoid legal liability. The issue arises when a terminally ill
patient requests end-of-life options from his or her physician, who chooses
to opt out of participation in the California Act. Subsequently, the
physician does not facilitate the transfer of the patient to another health
care provider who participates in the California Act, and instead performs
an alternative end-of-life option procedure. This physician may be liable
for negligence for breaching his duty to disclose this information to the
patient. Breaching this duty may likely be a violation of the patient's state
constitutional right to privacy due to the lack of bodily autonomy and self-
determination. In this situation, because the information about the
California Act and aid-in-dying would be considered information that
would be material to making an end-of-life decision, patients would have a
state constitutional right to the information through the right to privacy.
A possible solution would be to require physicians to inform all their
patients initially that they have opted out of the California Act. This would
at the very least give terminally ill patients notice of aid-in-dying as a
possible option when making end-of-life decisions. Under these
circumstances, the patient would be on notice of the refusal of disclosure of
the information about aid-in-dying, which may reduce the severity of the
intrusion.16 5 To facilitate the flow of information about the California Act,
in February 2016, the California Senate proposed the End of Life Option
Telephone Number Act, which would provide information about the new
End of Life Option Act through a toll-free line operated by the Department
of Public Health.16 6 The Committee on Health approved this bill, but was
ultimately voted down in the Appropriations Committee.'67 However, the
California Department of Public Health has a webpage that provides forms
and information for both providers and patients.16 8 Beyond this source,
many organizations have also been compiling resources for providers and
patients to utilize.16 9 These efforts may ameliorate much of the problems
caused by the current California Act by safeguarding the patient's right to
165. Ingersoll v. Palmer, 743 P.2d 1299, 1351 (Cal. 1987).
166. End of Life Option Telephone Number Act, S. 1002, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016).
167. California, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://www.deathwithdignity.org/states/california
(last visited Aug. 27, 2016).
168. See End of Life Option Act, CAL. DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH, https://www.cdph.ca.gov/
Pages/EndofLifeOptionAct.aspx (last visited Sept. 27, 2016).
169. Organizations such as the Coalition for Compassionate Care of California, Hemlock
Society of San Diego, UCSF/UC Hastings Consortium on Law, Science & Health Policy, and
Death with Dignity have all produced resources that clarify the current California Act and assist
both providers and patients with how to navigate and utilize the law.
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the information about aid-in-dying, while still protecting the physician's
interests. However, it is important to note that while the outcome will
essentially be the same, the physician still has an obligation to the patient to
obtain informed consent prior to performing a medical procedure. This
obligation still requires the physician to disclose information material to the
decision, which-under end-of-life situations-includes all alternatives
legally available to the patient (i.e., physician aid-in-dying).
Conclusion
As a vital inalienable act, the right to privacy grants the patient the
right to make medical decisions affecting his or her body, requiring the
patient to have the information necessary to make such a decision. The
broad conscience clause of the California Act results in physicians
violating patients' right to privacy by allowing physicians to refuse to give
the patient this material information. Similarly, as a matter of medical
malpractice, this conscience clause will also lead to physicians violating
their duty to obtain informed consent from the patient by not adequately
educating the patient prior to performing the medical procedure. Though
there are many resources that patients can utilize to get information on aid-
in-dying, it should not take away the legal obligations of the physician. As
a general policy matter, the courts should not shift the burden onto the
patients, requiring them to go through alternative means to fully secure
their rights. In doing so, the courts would impede the ever-important
objective in the field of medicine-to encourage physician-patient
communication.
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CECLY MAR, J.D..n...........................................Assistant Professor ofLaa
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